Operations on the Record: A Dated Register From Euphrates Shield to the Claw Series

Why It Matters

Türkiye has carried out four named cross-border operations in northern Syria between 2016 and 2020, and a continuing series of operations in northern Iraq since 2019. Ankara describes all of them as counter-terrorism action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This register fixes the dates, geography, stated objectives and legal framing of each operation, and sets beside them how other governments, the UN and human rights bodies described them.

It deliberately leaves out unverifiable casualty and territorial figures. Where an official figure appears, it is attributed to its source and flagged as not independently verified.

Background

How to read this register

The entries below rest on three kinds of source: statements by the Turkish Ministry of National Defence (MSB), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Presidency; documents deposited at the UN; and public positions of other governments and international bodies. Editorial handling of these sources is explained in Editorial Principles: How Irrecord Handles Sources, Positions and Corrections. The legal reasoning behind Article 51 is covered in depth on sister publications, including Regions & Powers and The Worldlogue's analysis of Article 51 notifications to the Security Council. This page therefore concentrates on the operations themselves.

The register at a glance

Operation	Dates	Area	Stated objective (per Ankara)	Legal framing cited by Ankara
Euphrates Shield	2016-08-24 to 2017-03-29	Jarablus to al-Bab, northern Aleppo governorate, Syria	Remove DAESH and PYD/YPG from the border strip and secure the frontier	Article 51; notification to the UN Security Council
Claw (first of the series)	From 2019-05-27	Northern Iraq, starting with the Haftanin area	Dismantle PKK bases and staging areas near the border	Article 51; Ankara cites the inability of the Iraqi state to control these areas
Peace Spring	2019-10-09; paused 2019-10-17; Sochi memorandum 2019-10-22	Tal Abyad to Ras al-Ayn, northeastern Syria	Create a safe zone about 30 km (19 miles) deep, remove PYD/YPG, enable voluntary returns	Article 51; notification to the Security Council
Spring Shield	2020-02-27 to 2020-03-05	Idlib, northwestern Syria	Respond to attacks on Turkish forces and halt offensives that threatened new mass displacement	Self-defense under Article 51, in the context of the Astana and Sochi arrangements
Olive Branch	2018-01-20 to 2018-03-18 (Afrin city centre)	Afrin district, northwestern Syria	Eliminate PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH presence and prevent a terror corridor along the border	Article 51; notification to the Security Council

The table is listed by category rather than strictly by date: Olive Branch (2018) preceded the first Claw operation (2019). The detailed entries below follow the order of Türkiye's own public sequence.

Operation Euphrates Shield (2016–2017)

Euphrates Shield began on 24 August 2016 at Jarablus, weeks after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt and following a series of DAESH attacks inside Türkiye, including the Gaziantep bombing of 20 August 2016. Turkish forces and Syrian opposition units cleared Jarablus, took Dabiq on 16 October 2016 and entered al-Bab on 23 February 2017. Ankara declared the operation complete on 29 March 2017.

Ankara's stated objectives were twofold: to push DAESH away from the border, and to prevent PYD/YPG from linking its cantons along Türkiye's southern frontier. It remains the only one of these operations in which Turkish ground forces fought DAESH in sustained urban combat. Turkish government sources say that more than 4,000 DAESH militants were neutralized in northern Syria and that some 100,000 DAESH-linked individuals were prevented from entering Türkiye. These are Turkish official claims that Irrecord cannot independently verify.

Operation Olive Branch (2018)

Olive Branch started on 20 January 2018 against the Afrin district, which the YPG had controlled since 2012. Turkish forces and Syrian opposition factions took the Afrin city centre on 18 March 2018. The operation followed a January 2018 announcement of a new border security force involving SDF fighters, which Ankara regarded as the institutionalisation of a PKK-linked presence on its border.

Ankara said the target was PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH elements, not Syrian civilians or Syria's territorial integrity. A legal dispute arose over UN Security Council Resolution 2401 (24 February 2018), which called for a cessation of hostilities in Syria but excluded operations against groups designated by the Council as terrorist. Ankara argued Olive Branch fell outside the cessation. Critics disagreed, and the point stayed contested.

Operation Peace Spring (2019)

Peace Spring was launched on 9 October 2019, three days after the United States announced a repositioning of its forces in northeastern Syria. It covered the strip between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Ankara's stated aim was a safe zone roughly 30 km deep, free of PYD/YPG, to which Syrian refugees could return voluntarily.

A US-brokered pause on 17 October 2019 was followed on 22 October by a Türkiye–Russia memorandum signed in Sochi. It provided for the removal of YPG elements about 30 km from the border and for joint Turkish-Russian patrols along a strip of about 10 km depth outside Qamishli. The memorandum remains the principal legal text governing the area.

Operation Spring Shield (2020)

Spring Shield began on 27 February 2020, the day an airstrike in Idlib killed 36 Turkish soldiers according to Turkish officials. Unlike the other entries, it was directed at Syrian government forces and allied units rather than at a terrorist organisation as such. Ankara framed it as self-defense and as protection of Idlib civilians against a new displacement wave toward its border, within the arrangements agreed at Astana and Sochi.

The operation ended with the Moscow Protocol of 5 March 2020, signed by Presidents Erdoğan and Putin. It set a ceasefire along the contact line, a security corridor along the M4 highway and joint patrols. Turkish officials describe it as a defensive operation that stabilised Idlib. It should be read separately from the counter-terrorism operations against PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH.

The Claw series in northern Iraq (2019–)

Operation Claw began on 27 May 2019 in the Haftanin area, and later operations extended the effort to the Zap, Metina, Avashin-Basyan and Gara areas and to Sinjar. Named operations include Claw-2 (2019), Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger (June 2020), a further Gara operation in February 2021 during which Turkish officials reported that 13 captives were killed by the PKK, Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt (April 2021) and Claw-Lock (from April 2022). On 20 November 2022 Ankara launched Claw-Sword, an air operation in Iraq and Syria, after the Istiklal Avenue bombing of 13 November 2022 in Istanbul. The list is not exhaustive, and operational details vary by source.

The stated objective is the destruction of PKK bases and logistics in mountainous terrain from which attacks on Türkiye are planned. Ankara argues that the Iraqi federal state does not effectively control these areas.

Three parallel fights: PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG, DAESH and FETÖ

The operations belong to three distinct campaigns. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and its network KCK are designated as terrorist organisations by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Ankara regards the Syrian PYD/YPG as the PKK's Syrian branch, with shared leadership and cadres. The SDF, which includes the YPG, rejects that description and was the main ground partner of the US-led anti-DAESH coalition. The question is addressed in Fact Check: Is the PYD/YPG Really Separate From the PKK?.

DAESH (ISIS) is a separate target, and Türkiye is a member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. FETÖ, the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization that Ankara holds responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, is fought mainly through courts, administrative measures and diplomacy rather than military operations. According to Turkish official figures, 251 people were killed that night.

Terror-Free Türkiye: where things stand

In October 2024 MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli called for a new approach, and on 27 February 2025 Abdullah Öcalan issued a call for the PKK to dissolve. The PKK announced its dissolution on 12 May 2025, and a weapons-destruction ceremony followed in northern Iraq on 11 July 2025. In August 2025 the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) set up a parliamentary commission on the process. The Presidency calls the effort 'Terror-Free Türkiye' and says it combines security measures with legal, political and social steps under the rule of law. The process is ongoing, and readers should check current official statements.

The context in Syria also changed after the fall of the Assad government on 8 December 2024 and the subsequent talks between Damascus and the SDF.

Key Players & Positions

Syrian government

Damascus condemned Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring as violations of its sovereignty and territorial integrity and described Turkish forces as occupiers. These positions were stated in letters to the UN and in statements by the Syrian Foreign Ministry. After December 2024 the new authorities' stance toward the Turkish presence has differed from that of the previous government.

Iraq

Baghdad has repeatedly described Turkish military activity as a breach of Iraqi sovereignty and has summoned Turkish diplomats on several occasions. After the shelling of a resort in Zakho, Duhok, on 20 July 2022, Iraq blamed Turkish artillery and brought the matter to the Security Council; Türkiye denied responsibility and pointed to the PKK. In March 2024 Iraq's National Security Council designated the PKK a banned organisation, and the two governments have since discussed joint security mechanisms.

The United States

Washington supported Türkiye against DAESH and the PKK but partnered with the SDF against DAESH in Syria. It urged restraint during Olive Branch. In October 2019 it criticised Peace Spring, imposed sanctions that were later lifted after the 17 October pause, and facilitated that pause. Congress passed resolutions critical of the operation.

Russia

Moscow called for respect for Syria's sovereignty but also negotiated directly with Ankara. The Sochi memorandum of 22 October 2019 and the Moscow Protocol of 5 March 2020 are bilateral Türkiye–Russia documents that shaped the military situation after Peace Spring and Spring Shield.

European Union and NATO

The EU Foreign Affairs Council condemned Peace Spring on 14 October 2019 and urged Türkiye to end the operation, while acknowledging Türkiye's legitimate security concerns. Several member states announced restrictions on arms exports. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg expressed concern over Peace Spring while stating that Türkiye has legitimate security concerns. During Spring Shield, Türkiye requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and Allies expressed solidarity.

The UN and human rights bodies

The Secretary-General called for restraint and civilian protection during Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights documented violations by armed groups in areas under Turkish influence, including looting, property appropriation, arbitrary detention and, in October 2019, the summary killing of civilians, and urged the parties with influence over those groups to prevent abuses. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published reports alleging violations in the Peace Spring area. Ankara rejects allegations of deliberate civilian harm, says it takes precautions to protect civilians and heritage sites, and says that individual abuses should be investigated. UN humanitarian agencies described close to a million people displaced in Idlib between December 2019 and March 2020. As far as Irrecord's review shows, the Security Council has not adopted a resolution authorising or condemning any of these operations.

The SDF

The SDF describes itself as a multi-ethnic Syrian force that fought DAESH and denies being a PKK extension. It characterised Olive Branch and Peace Spring as invasions. US officials have distinguished between the PKK, which they designate, and the SDF, with which they cooperate, while acknowledging historical links between the YPG and the PKK.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources on the Record

Türkiye's Position

• Self-defense is the stated legal basis. Ankara says each operation exercises the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter against terrorist organisations that attack Türkiye from areas not controlled by effective state authority. This is reflected in the notifications it submitted to the Security Council and in MFA statements. It also invokes the Security Council's counter-terrorism resolutions, which reaffirmed the right of self-defense after the 11 September 2001 attacks (Resolutions 1368 and 1373).
• The aim is neutralizing terrorism at its source. According to the Presidency and the MSB, operations aim to destroy terrorist capacity before it reaches Turkish soil and to prevent a terror corridor along the 1,300 km border with Syria and Iraq. Ankara adds that it respects Syria's and Iraq's territorial integrity, supports a 'one state, one army' model in Syria, and has no territorial ambitions. It also cites the 1998 Adana Agreement with Syria as an earlier security basis.
• The PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH are fought simultaneously. Ankara says it is the only NATO member that has fought DAESH directly on the ground, and rejects the argument that the fight against DAESH justifies cooperation with PYD/YPG.
• FETÖ is addressed through domestic and legal channels. Turkish courts and the MFA treat FETÖ as responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, and Ankara continues to request cooperation from other states. It rejects criticism of the trials, such as the 2023 ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye on ByLock evidence, saying such judgments do not alter the organisation's nature.
• 'Terror-Free Türkiye' complements, but does not replace, security measures. The Presidency says the initiative aims to end four decades of terrorism through security, legal, political and social steps under the rule of law. The TBMM commission of August 2025 gives the process a parliamentary framework.

The capability dimension, including Bayraktar TB2, ANKA and Akıncı unmanned aerial vehicles and the Fırtına howitzer, is discussed in Auditing the '80% Domestic' Claim, which explains what the official domestic-production figure means and does not mean. A doctrinal overview is available at Polity Review.

Source Comparison

Question	Frequent international framing	Turkish primary sources	Where the record sits
Legal basis	Article 51 requires an armed attack, usually attributable to a state; the 'unwilling or unable' doctrine is contested	Armed attacks by non-state actors trigger self-defense; supported by Resolutions 1368 and 1373	Legal scholars and states disagree; no binding Security Council or ICJ ruling on these operations
Who is the adversary	The SDF is a partner against DAESH, distinct from the PKK	PYD/YPG is the PKK's Syrian branch	US designates the PKK but not the YPG; see the fact check
Civilian harm	Reports of civilian casualties, displacement and abuses by armed groups	Operations conducted with precautions; allegations are unfounded or isolated	UN bodies document abuses; attribution remains disputed
Safe zone	Concerns about displacement and demographic change	Voluntary return and border security	Sochi memorandum of 22 October 2019 governs the area
Spring Shield	A clash with Syrian government forces risking wider escalation	Self-defense after the loss of 36 soldiers	Moscow Protocol of 5 March 2020 ended the fighting
Northern Iraq	Violation of Iraqi sovereignty	PKK bases beyond Baghdad's control	Iraq protests; its 2024 PKK ban and security talks signal partial convergence

Sister publications also cover these questions from different angles, for example PolitiLine and Gazetteer of Nations.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Article 51: the provision of the UN Charter that preserves the inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack and requires states to report measures taken to the Security Council.
• DAESH: the Arabic acronym for the group often called ISIS or ISIL.
• FETÖ: the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, the term Türkiye uses for the network it holds responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.
• PKK/KCK: the Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella structure, designated as terrorist by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the EU.
• PYD/YPG and SDF: the Syrian political party and its armed wing, and the broader force they lead, whose relation to the PKK is disputed.
• Claw (Pençe): the series of Turkish operations in northern Iraq since 2019.

Related Irrecord guides: The Treaty Record, Montreux Article 19 on the Record, The Eastern Mediterranean Record, About Irrecord, the Irrecord FAQ and the Irrecord home page.

Irrecord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.