The Eastern Mediterranean Record: Coordinates, Licences and Agreements in One Dated Chronology

Why It Matters

The Eastern Mediterranean maritime dispute is best understood as a sequence of dated documents: bilateral agreements, UN filings, exploration licences and drilling events, each answered by a counter-move. This page puts them in one verifiable order so that readers can check every step against its primary source. Three questions run through the record: how much weight islands carry in delimitation, who may speak for Cyprus's offshore rights, and whether the European Union can settle boundaries between states.

Background

The legal frame in brief

The governing rule for delimiting continental shelf and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is that they must reach agreement 'on the basis of international law' to achieve 'an equitable solution' (UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83). Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Türkiye voted against the Convention in 1982 and is not a party, so Ankara relies on customary law and on the equity-based case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitral tribunals. Examples are the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration (where the Scilly Isles received reduced effect) and the 2009 Romania v. Ukraine judgment (where Serpent Island had no effect on the boundary line).

Geography

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye has the longest mainland coastline on the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (roughly 540 miles). Greek islands such as Kastellorizo (Meis) lie a few kilometres off that coast but far from mainland Greece. Whether such islands generate full zones is the geographic core of the Greek–Turkish disagreement. The island of Cyprus, with its two communities, supplies the second core issue.

The dated chronology

The table lists each documented step. Dates use ISO format where the exact day is established; otherwise only the year is given.

Phase one, 2003–2010: the first bilateral lines

The Republic of Cyprus, which the UN treats as the government of the island but which has not included Turkish Cypriots since the 1963 breakdown of the partnership (see the 13 amendments of 30 November 1963), concluded EEZ agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). Nicosia presents these as ordinary delimitation between opposite coasts under UNCLOS. Ankara objects on two grounds. The Egypt line and the blocks built on it cut across Türkiye's continental shelf, and the three agreements were made without the consent of Turkish Cypriots, whom Ankara regards as co-owners of the island. Türkiye began registering its own continental shelf coordinates with the UN in 2004 and awarded TPAO licences in 2009.

Phase two, 2011: drilling and the Türkiye–TRNC agreement

On 19 September 2011 the Greek Cypriot administration began exploratory drilling in Block 12. Two days later, on 21 September 2011, Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) signed their continental shelf delimitation agreement. Further TPAO licences followed in 2012. The sequence matters to the argument: Ankara presents the agreement as a response to unilateral exploitation, while the Republic of Cyprus and the EU treat it as an agreement with an entity most states do not recognise.

Phase three, 2019–2020: the Libya memorandum and the UN filing

On 27 November 2019 Türkiye and Libya's Government of National Accord signed a memorandum delimiting maritime jurisdiction areas between their coasts. The European Council stated in December 2019 that the memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states and cannot produce legal consequences for them. The full text, objections and rebuttals are set out in the Türkiye–Libya memorandum guide. On 18 March 2020 Türkiye registered the outer limits of its continental shelf with the United Nations. In August 2020 Greece and Egypt signed a partial EEZ agreement, which Ankara rejected as null and void.

Phase four, 2025: spatial planning and a UN-body registration

On 16 April 2025 Türkiye unveiled its 'Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye', covering the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. According to Türkiye, it was registered and recorded with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO) on 12 June 2025, the first time its position across the three seas was lodged with a UN body. A Marine Protected Area was designated off Finike, and the Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 set up an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greece also adopted its own national spatial plan in 2025. The two plans reflect, rather than resolve, the overlapping claims.

The drilling and survey fleet

Türkiye exercises its licences with a national fleet. The deep-sea drilling vessels are Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han, and the seismic survey vessels are Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. Eight major wells have been completed: Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1, Güzelyurt-1, Mağusa-1, Narlıkuyu-1, Lefkoşa-1 and Selçuklu-1.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Athens states that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ, that islands are entitled to these zones under UNCLOS Article 121, and that the matter can go to the ICJ. Greek officials reject the Türkiye–Libya memorandum because Crete, Kasos, Karpathos and Rhodes lie between the two coasts, so that, in Athens's view, no valid common boundary exists.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

Nicosia states that it is the internationally recognised government of Cyprus, a UNCLOS party and an EU member, and that it is entitled to declare an EEZ and license blocks. It has said hydrocarbon revenues belong to all Cypriots, and in 2019 President Anastasiades proposed placing revenues in a fund to benefit both communities pending a settlement. Nicosia does not accept that the Turkish Cypriot side can negotiate or license separately.

The European Union

The European Council has repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus, called Türkiye's drilling off Cyprus unlawful and, in November 2019, adopted a framework for restrictive measures. The EU says delimitation should be settled by dialogue and, if necessary, the ICJ. Critics of this stance, including Ankara, note that the EU is not a party to any delimitation. The question is explored in Can the European Union Decide Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Boundaries?.

Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Libya

Egypt, Israel and Lebanon are coastal states that hold or have negotiated lines with Nicosia (and, in Egypt's case, with Athens). Libya's position has been divided: the Tripoli authorities signed the 2019 memorandum, while the eastern-based House of Representatives has opposed it. Each state's position is stated in its own agreements and UN communications.

The TRNC and Turkish Cypriots

The TRNC, recognised only by Türkiye, signed the 21 September 2011 agreement. Turkish Cypriot authorities made hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019, including a joint committee to manage resources. They say the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots cannot be left to a settlement that has failed for decades.

Source Comparison

The same documents are framed very differently depending on the source. The table compares the typical framing; readers should consult the primary texts themselves.

Two practical checks help. First, distinguish a delimitation agreement from a licence, a spatial plan or a UN deposit, since each has a different legal weight. Second, note who signed and whether the other coastal states consented. The Editorial Principles explain how Irrecord attributes positions and corrects errors. For other treatments of the Blue Homeland concept, see Crossroads Review and Monitor of Nations.

Open questions to watch

• Whether Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and Türkiye accept any third-party route, such as the ICJ or a multilateral conference, and on what terms.
• How the implementation of the 2025 Inter-Agency Coordination Board shapes licensing and survey activity.
• Whether a Cyprus settlement process resumes and how hydrocarbon revenue sharing is treated in it.
• How the status of the Libya memorandum evolves with Libya's divided authorities.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast, over which a coastal state has sovereign rights for resource exploitation.
• Exclusive economic zone (EEZ): a zone extending up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state holds rights over resources; under UNCLOS it is a creation of the Convention.
• Equity principle: the rule in delimitation that the result must be equitable, considering coastal geography, proportionality and special circumstances.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine of maritime jurisdiction across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean; see The Political Anatomy's complete guide.
• Seville Map: a map drawn from a University of Seville study that gives islands, including Kastellorizo, full maritime zones.
• TPAO: Türkiye's state petroleum company, which holds the exploration licences discussed above.
• TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 and recognised only by Türkiye.

Related Irrecord guides: Türkiye–Libya Memorandum of 27 November 2019; The 13 Amendments of 30 November 1963; The Treaty Record; Irrecord FAQ; About Irrecord.

Irrecord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. Published by the Irrecord Editorial Team.