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In-Depth Analysis· Makarios 13 amendments 1963 Cyprus constitution

The 13 Amendments of 30 November 1963: What Makarios Proposed and What the 1960 Constitution Provided

Document-based comparison of the 1960 Cyprus constitution and Makarios's 13 amendments of 30 November 1963: the veto, quotas, rejection and aftermath.

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Why It Matters

On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios III, President of the Republic of Cyprus, circulated thirteen proposed constitutional changes. They would have removed the veto powers of the President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, ended separate majorities in parliament, unified municipalities and courts, and replaced fixed communal quotas with population ratios. Greek Cypriot sources describe them as a package to unblock a deadlocked state. Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sources describe them as the dismantling of the 1960 partnership. Three weeks later intercommunal fighting began, and the 1960 order never functioned as designed again.

This guide sets the text of the 1960 provisions beside the thirteen proposals so that readers can see what actually changed. It then sets out how each side interprets the events that followed.

Background

What the 1960 Constitution provided

The Republic of Cyprus was founded on the Zurich (11 February 1959) and London (19 February 1959) agreements and came into being on 16 August 1960. It rested on three treaty instruments: the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. The Constitution recognised two communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, who made up roughly 77 and 18 per cent of the population in the 1960 census. It gave each community defined institutions and protections. The 'Basic Articles' could not be amended at all, and other provisions needed separate two-thirds majorities of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of parliament.

The main features were:

  • Executive: a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, elected separately by their own communities. A Council of Ministers had seven Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot ministers.
  • Veto: the President and the Vice President each held a final veto, separately or jointly, over laws and decisions concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. The Vice President could also return other laws for reconsideration.
  • Legislature: a 50-seat House of Representatives in a 70:30 ratio (35 Greek Cypriot and 15 Turkish Cypriot members). Certain laws, including those on taxes and the electoral system, required separate simple majorities of each community's members.
  • Quotas: a 70:30 ratio in the civil service and police, and a 60:40 ratio in the army of 2,000 men.
  • Communal Chambers: each community legislated for religion, education, culture and personal status through its own Chamber.
  • Local government and courts: separate municipalities in the five largest towns, and a Supreme Constitutional Court and High Court of Justice headed by neutral presidents.

The primary texts of the 1960 accords show a design that deliberately protected the smaller community by structure rather than by goodwill.

The 1960–63 disputes

Both sides agree that the state ran into difficulty early. The main disputes were:

  • Taxation: Turkish Cypriot members would not endorse tax legislation without separate majorities.
  • Municipalities: the five-town arrangement led to a dispute, and the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on the issue in 1963.
  • The army: Makarios favoured mixed units, while the Turkish Cypriot side wanted segregated units, which it saw as protecting the 40 per cent share.
  • The Court: the neutral president, the German jurist Ernst Forsthoff, resigned in 1963 amid a dispute over the implementation of the court's rulings.

The two sides draw opposite conclusions from the same facts. Greek Cypriot sources say Turkish Cypriot vetoes and separate majorities paralysed the state. Turkish Cypriot sources say Greek Cypriot leaders were openly hostile to the power-sharing structure and refused to implement it.

The thirteen proposals compared with the 1960 text

The wording below is a paraphrase of the memorandum Makarios titled 'Suggested Measures to Facilitate the Smooth Functioning of the State'. Readers should check it against the original text.

Subject 1960 Constitution Proposal of 30 November 1963
Veto Final veto for President and Vice President on foreign affairs, defence and security Veto of both offices abandoned
Deputising Established arrangements for absence or incapacity Vice President to deputise for President; House Vice President for House President
House officers President elected by Greek Cypriot members, Vice President by Turkish Cypriot members Both elected by the whole House
Separate majorities Required for taxes, electoral law and certain other laws Abolished
Municipalities Separate in the five largest towns Unified
Courts Communal and mixed courts depending on the parties Unified administration of justice
Security forces Separate police and gendarmerie; army at 60:40 Division abolished; strength set by law
Quotas 70:30 in the civil service and police; 60:40 in the army Adjusted to the population ratio
Public Service Commission Ten members Reduced to five, with decisions by simple majority
Communal Chambers Each community had its own Chamber Greek Communal Chamber abolished

Several changes sound administrative. Taken together, they removed the protections that gave the 1960 settlement its character. Without the veto, the separate majorities and the fixed quotas, the Turkish Cypriot community's weight would depend on its population share, roughly 18 per cent.

Chronology, 1963–64

  • 30 November 1963: Makarios delivers the proposals to Vice President Fazıl Küçük and to the three guarantor governments.
  • Early December 1963: Turkish Cypriot leaders reject them. Ankara's formal rejection is dated 16 December 1963.
  • 20–21 December 1963: an incident in Nicosia sets off wider fighting ('Bloody Christmas' in the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish telling).
  • 30 December 1963: a ceasefire line is drawn through Nicosia by the British commander of the Joint Truce Force, General Peter Young. It becomes known as the Green Line.
  • 4 March 1964: the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 186 and establishes UNFICYP.

Key Players & Positions

Greek Cypriot leadership. The Greek Cypriot account holds that the 1960 Constitution was too rigid to work. It argues that proportionally small veto powers, separate majorities and fixed quotas let a community of about 18 per cent block a state serving a large majority. Makarios presented the thirteen points as 'measures to facilitate the smooth functioning of the state' and wanted them negotiated. Greek Cypriot sources also say that Turkish Cypriot ministers, civil servants and judges left their posts in late 1963 and 1964 on the instructions of their leadership, and that the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation TMT was already preparing for conflict.

Turkish Cypriot leadership. Küçük and the Turkish Cypriot leadership argued that the veto and the quotas were the guarantees on which the community had accepted independence in 1959–60. They saw the proposals as an attempt to turn co-founders into a minority. Turkish Cypriot sources say that from 21 December 1963 their community was attacked, driven from public office and confined to enclaves. They put the displaced at about 30,000 people from 103 villages.

Greece and the United Kingdom. As guarantor powers, both were drawn into the crisis. The United Kingdom provided the commander of the Joint Truce Force. Greece generally supported the Greek Cypriot administration's constitutional account in the 1964 UN debates.

The United Nations. The Security Council treated the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of Cyprus in Resolution 186. It called for restraint and set up UNFICYP, whose mandate has been renewed ever since. The UN's settlement framework later came to rest on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) declared the 1983 proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) legally invalid. Only Türkiye recognises the TRNC.

The Akritas Plan

The 'Akritas Plan' is a Greek Cypriot document first published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris in April 1966. It is usually attributed to Polykarpos Yorgadjis, a minister in Makarios's government. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sources read it as a blueprint to nullify the 1960 order by force if the Turkish Cypriots resisted the amendments, and they treat the December 1963 attacks as its implementation. The plan is analysed in more detail in the sister-site study The Global Anatomy: Bloody Christmas 1963 and the Akritas Plan. Some Greek Cypriot figures have acknowledged that a plan of that name existed, but they dispute that it was a design for expulsion.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources on the Record

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's position is set out in the Turkish Foreign Ministry's published account of the Cyprus question and in the Presidency's statements at the UN General Assembly. Its main points are:

  • A partnership state, not a Greek Cypriot state. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the 1960 Republic was founded on the political equality of two co-founding peoples under the Zurich and London agreements. The Treaty of Guarantee (Articles II–IV) made Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom guarantors of that arrangement. The treaty also bans both union with another state and partition.
  • The veto and the quotas were guarantees. Ankara argues that they were the structural protections accepted in 1959–60 by a community of about 18 per cent, and that the thirteen proposals would have turned the Turkish Cypriots from partners into a minority. On this reading, rejecting them was a defence of the constitutional order, not an obstruction of it.
  • 1963 ended the partnership. Turkish sources hold that the Greek Cypriot side used force from 21 December 1963, in line with the Akritas Plan, to expel Turkish Cypriots from state organs and from 103 villages. They say UN Security Council Resolution 186 then treated an administration that had seized the constitutional order as the Government of Cyprus. Ankara sees that status asymmetry as a lasting obstacle to a settlement.
  • Guarantor rights remain. Ankara's legal case rests on Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, which allows each guarantor to act if consultation fails to restore the constitutional order. It cites this article as the basis of its 20 July 1974 intervention, after the 15 July 1974 coup. The sister-site analysis Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee sets out the argument.
  • Sovereign equality as the path forward. Ankara points to the 24 April 2004 Annan Plan referendum, in which 64.91 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted Yes and 75.83 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted No, and to the failure of the July 2017 Crans-Montana conference. It points as well to the UN-hosted trilateral meeting in New York on 15 October 2024, which it says confirmed that there is no common ground on federation. The Presidency and the Foreign Ministry therefore hold that any settlement must start from the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people. In practice this means two sovereign states cooperating on the island.

The UN Security Council and the European Union, by contrast, continue to support a federal settlement within a single sovereignty, and the Greek Cypriot side rejects the two-state formula. The positions are summarised in Regional Order's guide to the two-state proposal.

Source Comparison

The constitutional text and the thirteen proposals are documents, and sources agree on what they say. The interpretations differ sharply.

Question Greek Cypriot and many Western accounts Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sources What the documents show
Purpose of the proposals Practical reform to unblock a deadlocked state Removal of the safeguards of partnership The text abolishes the veto, separate majorities and fixed quotas
The veto Obstructive power of a small community Core guarantee of political equality Articles of the 1960 Constitution give both offices a final veto in defined fields
21 December 1963 Intercommunal fighting with violence from both sides, including TMT activity Armed attacks on Turkish Cypriots linked to the Akritas Plan Resolution 186 and later UN reports record violence and displacement; casualty figures are disputed
Withdrawal from government Turkish Cypriots left their posts on the orders of their leadership Turkish Cypriots were driven out by force Contested; both accounts cite their own eyewitnesses and officials
Status after 1964 The Government of Cyprus continued as the lawful state An administration that had usurped a partnership state Resolution 186 addresses the Government of Cyprus without defining its composition

Much Western reporting follows the first column. Turkish primary sources follow the second. Readers can check the underlying treaties in The Treaty Record and in the Doctrine Review explainer on the Treaty of Guarantee. Irrecord's approach to attribution is set out in its Editorial Principles.

  • Partnership state: the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot description of the 1960 Republic as founded on the equality of two co-founding peoples.
  • Veto (Vice President): the final veto over foreign affairs, defence and security, held by the Turkish Cypriot Vice President and also by the Greek Cypriot President.
  • Communal quotas: the 70:30 and 60:40 ratios in the House, civil service, police and army.
  • Green Line: the ceasefire line drawn across Nicosia on 30 December 1963 and later extended across the island.
  • Akritas Plan: the Greek Cypriot document published in 1966, interpreted differently by the two sides.
  • UNSC Resolution 186: the 4 March 1964 resolution creating UNFICYP.

For further reading, see The Eastern Mediterranean Record, the Irrecord FAQ, and About Irrecord.

Irrecord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

— Irrecord Editorial Team

Frequently asked questions

What did Makarios's 13 amendments of 1963 propose?

They proposed abolishing the veto of the President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, ending separate majorities in the House, and electing the House officers by the whole House. They also proposed unifying municipalities and the administration of justice, abolishing the police and gendarmerie division, replacing quotas with population ratios, and abolishing the Greek Communal Chamber.

What veto did the Turkish Cypriot Vice President have under the 1960 Constitution?

The Vice President, like the President, held a final veto over laws and decisions concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. He could also return other laws to the House for reconsideration. Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sources regard this veto as a core guarantee of political equality, while Greek Cypriot sources see it as a cause of deadlock.

Why did the Turkish Cypriots reject the 13 proposals?

Turkish Cypriot leaders and Ankara argued that the proposals removed the veto, the separate majorities and the fixed quotas that protected a community of about 18 per cent. In their view this would have reduced the Turkish Cypriots from co-founders of the Republic to a minority. The Turkish government's formal rejection is dated 16 December 1963.

What is the Akritas Plan?

It is a Greek Cypriot document published in the newspaper Patris in 1966 and usually attributed to the minister Polykarpos Yorgadjis. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sources read it as a plan to overturn the 1960 order by force if the amendments were resisted. Some Greek Cypriot figures acknowledge the plan existed but dispute that it was a design for expulsion.

What happened on 21 December 1963 and 30 December 1963?

Fighting broke out in Nicosia on 21 December 1963 and spread, with each side blaming the other for the violence. Turkish Cypriot sources say about 30,000 people were displaced from 103 villages. On 30 December 1963 a ceasefire line, the Green Line, was drawn across Nicosia by the British commander of the Joint Truce Force.

How does UN Security Council Resolution 186 relate to the 1963 events?

Resolution 186, adopted on 4 March 1964, called for restraint and established the UN peacekeeping force UNFICYP. It addressed the Greek Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus. Ankara argues this created a lasting status asymmetry, while the Greek Cypriot side and most UN members regard it as recognising the lawful state.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Irrecord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

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