In-Depth Analysis· Armenia Türkiye normalization talks Kılıç Rubinyan

Kılıç and Rubinyan Talks Since 14 January 2022: The Record of Armenia–Türkiye Normalization

The Armenia Türkiye normalization talks of Kılıç and Rubinyan since 14 January 2022: context, positions, Azerbaijan's role and the 2005 commission proposal.

By Irrecord Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,828 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Special Representatives Ambassador Serdar Kılıç (Türkiye) and Ruben Rubinyan (Armenia) opened direct normalization talks in Moscow on 14 January 2022, with further rounds in Vienna on 24 February and 1 July 2022.
Ankara describes the process as normalization without preconditions, aimed at full diplomatic relations and regional peace in the South Caucasus; the land border has been closed since 1993.
The track builds on, but differs from, two earlier initiatives: Erdoğan's April 2005 proposal for a Joint Historical Commission and the unratified 2009 Zurich Protocols, which Armenia annulled in 2018.
Azerbaijan is not a party to the talks, but the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including the text initialled in Washington on 8 August 2025, shapes their pace and regional context.
Armenia and many other states and scholars use the word genocide for 1915, while Türkiye rejects it and argues the question belongs with historians and, legally, with a competent international tribunal.

Why It Matters

The Kılıç–Rubinyan track is the first sustained, direct, official dialogue between Ankara and Yerevan since the 2009 Zurich Protocols collapsed. It matters because it tests whether the two countries can establish diplomatic relations and reopen a land border closed since 1993, in a South Caucasus reshaped by the 2020 Karabakh War. Ankara frames the process as normalization without preconditions. Armenia's government has said it wants relations and an open border, and both sides have kept the format alive through several regional shocks.

Background

From recognition to a closed border

Türkiye recognized Armenia's independence in December 1991 but did not establish diplomatic relations. The land border has been closed since 1993, during the first Karabakh conflict. The two countries have no formal diplomatic ties, although some trade has moved through third countries and some civil society contacts have continued.

Two earlier attempts shaped today's talks:

10 April 2005: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wrote to Armenian President Robert Kocharian proposing a Joint Historical Commission of Turkish and Armenian historians and experts to study the events of 1915 and open all relevant archives. Armenia's reply favoured establishing diplomatic relations first and discussing the historical question at the intergovernmental level.
10 October 2009: The two foreign ministers signed the Zurich Protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral relations. The texts contemplated mutual recognition of the existing border as defined by relevant treaties and a dialogue on the historical dimension. Neither parliament ratified them, and Armenia annulled them in March 2018.

The post-Karabakh War context

The 44-day war ran from 27 September to 10 November 2020 and ended with a trilateral statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Azerbaijan regained control of the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023 Azerbaijan carried out a further military operation that ended the separatist administration there, and most of the Armenian population left the area. Ankara and Yerevan both read this changed landscape as an opening for a new attempt at normalization.

Dated chronology of the track

Date	Event
December 2021	Ankara and Yerevan name Ambassador Serdar Kılıç and Deputy Speaker Ruben Rubinyan as Special Representatives
14 January 2022	First meeting in Moscow; both sides state they will continue talks without preconditions toward full normalization
February 2022	Direct commercial flights between Istanbul and Yerevan begin, following the first round
24 February 2022	Second meeting in Vienna
1 July 2022	Third meeting in Vienna; statements refer to further practical steps
6 October 2022	Erdoğan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan meet in Prague on the margins of the European Political Community summit
11 February 2023	After the 6 February earthquakes in Türkiye, an Armenian humanitarian convoy crosses the Margara–Alican border point, the first use of the crossing in decades
20 June 2025	Pashinyan meets Erdoğan in Istanbul
8 August 2025	Armenia and Azerbaijan initial a peace agreement text in Washington

The Armenian and Turkish foreign ministries have published statements on each round. Readers should consult those texts for exact wording, since the sides have deliberately kept most communiqués short.

Key Players & Positions

Armenia

Armenia's government has repeatedly stated its readiness to establish diplomatic relations and open the border without preconditions. Prime Minister Pashinyan has promoted a 'Crossroads of Peace' concept that would route regional transport and trade links through Armenia under its sovereignty and jurisdiction. Armenian officials, together with the Armenian diaspora and many parliaments, continue to describe the events of 1915 as genocide. Armenia has generally said that this question should not be a condition for establishing relations. Opposition figures in Armenia criticize the process as concessions made from a position of weakness.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is not at the table, but it is closely connected to the process. President Ilham Aliyev's government presents the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty as the main regional priority. Baku has also raised issues such as transit connectivity through southern Armenia and constitutional language in Armenia's founding documents. The Washington declaration of 8 August 2025 included a transit route concept that US officials called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. Turkish officials have said that a peace settlement between Baku and Yerevan would give additional momentum to Türkiye–Armenia steps.

Russia, Austria, the United States and the European Union

Russia hosted the first meeting in Moscow in January 2022, and Austria hosted the Vienna rounds. The United States and the European Union have publicly encouraged normalization and the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. The Washington declaration of August 2025 also placed the United States directly in the regional diplomacy. Georgia, as a transit neighbour of both Armenia and Türkiye, benefits from open regional routes.

Armenian diaspora and international parliaments

Many diaspora organizations and a number of parliaments hold that recognition of 1915 as genocide is central to Armenian memory and justice. Some diaspora groups are sceptical that normalization can serve Armenian interests unless it addresses that question. Parliaments that have passed recognition resolutions argue that they are acting on historical scholarship and human rights principles. Ankara rejects such political resolutions, as the next section explains.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources on the Record

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's stated policy, as set out by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, rests on the following points:

Normalization without preconditions. The Turkish Foreign Ministry's statement on the 14 January 2022 meeting said the Special Representatives agreed to continue talks without preconditions, aimed at full normalization. Ankara holds that this approach serves lasting peace and stability in the South Caucasus. It also stresses that it wants this process to advance together with the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, with which Türkiye is closely aligned. Ankara says this reflects regional reality, not a precondition.
A historians' forum, not political resolutions. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye proposed in 2005 a Joint Historical Commission of Turkish, Armenian and international historians with access to Ottoman, Armenian and third-country archives. The Grand National Assembly (TBMM) supported the proposal in April 2005. Ankara argues that the proposal remains on the table and that political bodies in third countries cannot settle historical disputes through resolutions. Under this approach, the diplomatic track and the historical track can proceed in parallel.
Legal criteria for 'genocide'. Türkiye points out that genocide is a legal category defined in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, which requires proof of specific intent (dolus specialis) established by a competent court. Ankara says no international tribunal has made such a finding for the Events of 1915. It also notes that the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber, in Perinçek v. Switzerland (2015), found a Swiss conviction for denying the Armenian genocide violated freedom of expression, while saying it was not itself ruling on the legal characterization of 1915. The Turkish Foreign Ministry describes the Relocation and Resettlement Law of 27 May 1915 as a wartime security measure. This is the Turkish reading; Armenian and many other scholars interpret the same events differently. For the archival evidence, see our guide to the Ottoman archives and the Events of 1915.
Border and treaty framework. Ankara maintains that the border is fixed by the Treaties of Moscow (16 March 1921) and Kars (13 October 1921), to which Soviet Armenia was a party, and that Lausanne (24 July 1923) settled Türkiye's international status and minority rights on the basis of equal citizenship. Türkiye considers the unratified 1920 Treaty of Sèvres to have no legal force. It wants a clear reaffirmation of the existing border in the normalization process, consistent with the 2009 protocols. The texts are collected in The Treaty Record: Lausanne, Kars, Montreux and the 1960 Cyprus Accords as Primary Documents.
Regional peace and connectivity. President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have described border opening, trade and transport links as part of a broader peaceful order in the South Caucasus. Türkiye points to its aid response in February 2023 and to the June 2025 Istanbul meeting as steps showing good faith.

Source Comparison

Coverage of the talks varies mainly in how it treats three issues: the sequence of steps, the weight of 1915, and Azerbaijan's role.

Issue	Turkish primary sources	Armenian official and diaspora sources	International media and think tanks
Nature of the process	Normalization without preconditions, full diplomatic relations and open border as goals	Same stated aim; Armenian officials stress sovereignty and a border opening without conditions	Often 'thaw' or 'rapprochement', with attention to slow practical results
1915	A matter for historians and a Joint Historical Commission; legal term 'genocide' not established by a competent tribunal	Genocide recognized; many in the diaspora oppose treating it as negotiable	Mixed: many outlets use 'genocide' as settled, others describe a contested political and legal debate
Azerbaijan	Closely aligned; peace between Baku and Yerevan seen as a regional multiplier	Armenia seeks to separate the Türkiye track from the Azerbaijan track, while negotiating both	Frequently describe a de facto linkage, with Azerbaijan's priorities influencing timing
Third parties	Russia and Austria as hosts; US welcome as supportive	Welcomes Western and Russian involvement, with concerns about balance	Emphasize Russian decline, US mediation in 2025 and EU interests

For parallel analyses within our network, see Regions & Powers on the 2022 normalization and the Joint Historical Commission, Monitor of Nations on the proposed commission and Bloc Politics on archives, legal criteria and the path to normalization. Irrecord's own handling of positions and sources is described in Editorial Principles.

Special Representatives: Envoys appointed in December 2021 to lead the dialogue: Ambassador Serdar Kılıç for Türkiye and Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of Armenia's National Assembly.
Normalization without preconditions: The formula both governments use publicly. Its practical meaning, especially the relationship to Armenia–Azerbaijan peace, is interpreted differently by commentators.
Zurich Protocols (2009): Two protocols on diplomatic relations and development of bilateral ties, never ratified, annulled by Armenia in 2018.
Joint Historical Commission: The 2005 Turkish proposal for a joint scholarly body with access to all relevant archives. The Zurich Protocols also contemplated a sub-commission on the historical dimension.
Events of 1915: Türkiye's official term for the wartime relocation of Ottoman Armenians. Armenia and many others use 'Armenian Genocide'.
Margara–Alican crossing: The border point on the closed Turkish–Armenian land frontier used for the February 2023 earthquake relief convoy.

Irrecord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Frequently asked questions

When did the Kılıç–Rubinyan talks begin?

The first meeting between Ambassador Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan took place in Moscow on 14 January 2022. Both sides said they would continue talks without preconditions toward full normalization. Further rounds were held in Vienna on 24 February and 1 July 2022.

Is the Türkiye–Armenia land border open?

The border has been closed since 1993, and as far as the public record shows it has not been fully reopened. Practical steps such as direct flights and the February 2023 earthquake relief convoy at Margara–Alican have occurred. Readers should check the latest Turkish and Armenian foreign ministry statements for any change.

How does the 2005 Joint Historical Commission proposal relate to the current talks?

Erdoğan proposed the commission on 10 April 2005, and Ankara says it remains on the table. The Kılıç–Rubinyan track is a diplomatic process aimed at relations and the border, while the commission would address the historical question. Armenia has favoured establishing relations first and has not accepted the commission as a condition.

What is Azerbaijan's role in the normalization process?

Azerbaijan is not a participant in the Kılıç–Rubinyan talks. However, the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including the text initialled in Washington on 8 August 2025, shapes the regional context. Turkish officials say a Baku–Yerevan settlement would give added momentum to Türkiye–Armenia steps.

Why do Türkiye and Armenia disagree about 1915?

Armenia and many other states and scholars describe the 1915 deportations and killings as genocide. Türkiye uses the term Events of 1915, rejects the genocide characterization, and argues that the legal term requires proof of specific intent determined by a competent court. It proposes a joint historians' commission instead of political resolutions.

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