Montreux Article 19 on the Record: How Türkiye Applied the Straits Regime to Warships in 2022
How Türkiye applied Montreux Convention Article 19 to belligerent warships in the Turkish Straits after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and its limits.
Why It Matters
The 1936 Montreux Convention is the treaty that decides which warships can enter or leave the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and Article 19 governs wartime. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Türkiye said it would apply that article, meaning belligerent states' warships could not transit, except to return to their home bases. The move shaped Black Sea naval geography for years, and it is also frequently misdescribed as a Turkish power to 'close the Straits' whenever it wishes.
Background
What the Convention does
Montreux was signed on 20 July 1936 and entered into force on 9 November 1936, replacing the Lausanne Straits regime of 1923. It restored full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits (about 30 km / 19 miles for the Bosphorus and about 61 km / 38 miles for the Dardanelles, linked by the Sea of Marmara) and set a layered regime:
- Merchant ships: freedom of transit and navigation in peacetime (Article 1) and, when Türkiye is not at war, also in wartime (Article 2), subject to Turkish safety and sanitary rules.
- Peacetime warships (Articles 10–18): Black Sea states have broader rights; non-Black Sea states face limits on individual tonnage, aggregate tonnage, and length of stay in the Black Sea (21 days), plus advance notification to Türkiye.
- Wartime, Türkiye neutral (Article 19): warships of belligerents may not pass, with narrow exceptions.
- Wartime, Türkiye belligerent, or threatened (Articles 20–21): Türkiye has full discretion over warship passage.
The Convention has no fixed expiry: its original 20-year term lapsed in 1956 and it continues because no party has given notice of denunciation.
What Article 19 says
In plain terms, Article 19 provides that when Türkiye is not a belligerent, warships generally enjoy transit under the peacetime rules, but warships of belligerent powers shall not pass the Straits. Two exceptions are written into the text: cases arising under Article 25 and assistance to a victim of aggression under a mutual-assistance treaty binding Türkiye that was concluded within the League of Nations Covenant framework and registered as required. A separate clause allows belligerent warships that have become separated from their bases to return to them. The Convention also prohibits captures, search and other hostile acts in the Straits.
Key dates in 2022 and after
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 24 Feb 2022 | Russia launches full-scale invasion; Ukraine asks Türkiye to close the Straits to Russian warships |
| 27–28 Feb 2022 | Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu says Türkiye assesses the situation as a war and will implement Article 19 |
| Early Mar 2022 | Turkish officials say passage is barred for belligerents' warships except documented returns to home bases |
| 22 Jul 2022 | Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul under UN and Turkish auspices |
| 17 Jul 2023 | Russia ends its participation in the Grain Initiative |
| 11 Jan 2024 | Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria sign an agreement on a Black Sea mine countermeasures task group |
For the wider treaty context see The Treaty Record: Lausanne, Kars, Montreux and the 1960 Cyprus Accords as Primary Documents. Sister publications offer parallel explainers, including The Political Anatomy on Article 19 and Black Sea security and Bloc Politics on how Türkiye governs Straits access.
Key Players & Positions
Ukraine
Ukrainian officials, including the foreign minister and the ambassador in Ankara, urged Türkiye in the first days of the invasion to use its Montreux powers against Russian warships, and welcomed Ankara's decision to apply Article 19. Some Ukrainian voices later argued that the home-base exception and tonnage rules left gaps that Russia could exploit.
Russia
Russian officials have said Moscow respects the Montreux regime and treats the Straits question as one for Türkiye's sovereign implementation. Moscow has also criticised the presence of non-riparian NATO navies in the Black Sea and has argued that the Convention's limits on such ships must be strictly observed.
NATO and its Black Sea members
NATO allies, including Romania and Bulgaria, which are Black Sea coastal states and NATO members, have generally said they respect Montreux and Türkiye's role as its custodian. Washington and other capitals have called for the Convention to be implemented faithfully. Some analysts in allied countries want more visible Allied naval presence, which the tonnage and duration limits constrain. Allied states are not bound by Article 19 as such unless they become belligerents.
Türkiye
Ankara presents the Convention as a balanced instrument that keeps the Black Sea from becoming an arena of great-power naval rivalry. Its stated approach is to apply the text equally to all belligerents, keep the Straits open to merchant shipping, and decline to revise the treaty.
Türkiye's Position
- Treaty-based, not discretionary. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu's statements of 27–28 February 2022, Türkiye assessed the situation in Ukraine as a war and moved to apply Article 19 as a treaty duty. Ankara argues this is implementation of Montreux, not an ad hoc closure.
- Impartial application. Turkish officials state that the restriction applies to all belligerents, Russian or Ukrainian, riparian or not, and that the home-base exception remains available to any belligerent warship able to document its return. The Turkish government presents this equal treatment as the core of its credibility as a mediator.
- Merchant shipping stays open. Ankara emphasises that Article 2 keeps the Straits open to commercial vessels when Türkiye is not at war, and that traffic continues under its Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits. Turkish sources also tie this to Istanbul-based diplomacy, including the July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative.
- No revision of Montreux. The Presidency and Foreign Ministry have repeatedly said Türkiye wants the Convention preserved as a stabilising framework, and that unilateral reinterpretation by any party, whether to curtail or enlarge naval access, would weaken Black Sea security.
- Territorial integrity and dialogue. Türkiye says it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, including non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea, while keeping channels open to both Moscow and Kyiv. It describes its arms sales to Ukraine as commercial contracts, and says its balanced policy lets it host talks and prisoner exchanges.
The legal basis cited by Ankara is the text of Montreux itself, Türkiye's sovereign rights over the Straits restored by the 1936 treaty, and Article 25's preservation of Türkiye's obligations under the League Covenant (now understood alongside the UN Charter). See also The Global Anatomy on Montreux and Türkiye's mediation.
Source Comparison
| Question | Turkish primary sources | International media and analysts |
|---|---|---|
| Did Türkiye 'close the Straits'? | Article 19 was applied to belligerent warships; merchant passage continues | Headlines often say 'Türkiye closes the Straits to warships', which blurs the distinction between treaty application and a general closure |
| Was it impartial? | Applied equally to all belligerents; return to home bases allowed on documentation | Some commentators say the home-base exception and the timing favoured Russia; others say it hurt Russia's reinforcement most |
| Is Türkiye neutral overall? | Balanced policy, supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, mediates, rejects sanctions as its own policy | Critics point to Ankara's non-participation in Western sanctions and its trade with Russia; others highlight its Ukraine arms sales |
| Can it close the Straits at will? | Only within Montreux's text: Articles 19, 20 and 21 | Public debate sometimes assumes unlimited Turkish discretion |
When reading coverage, check whether a report quotes the treaty text or only a spokesperson's summary, a method set out in Editorial Principles: How Irrecord Handles Sources, Positions and Corrections.
Black Sea security implications
By limiting belligerent warships, Article 19 sealed the Black Sea's entrances against reinforcements for Russia's Black Sea Fleet from other fleets, and likewise against third-party belligerent ships. It did not, however, remove the fleet already in the sea, and Ukraine's own naval capacity was small. The 2024 trilateral mine-clearing arrangement among Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria shows how littoral NATO states have also turned to cooperation within the Convention's framework. Regional maritime questions beyond the Black Sea are covered in The Eastern Mediterranean Record.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Belligerent: a state engaged in an armed conflict. Montreux does not define 'war' or say who determines it; in 2022 Türkiye made its own assessment.
- Home-base exception: the clause allowing belligerent warships separated from their bases to return to them.
- Riparian (Black Sea) state: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine. Their warships get more favourable peacetime treatment than non-riparian ones.
- Articles 20–21: provide Türkiye full discretion if it is belligerent or considers itself threatened by imminent danger of war.
- Straits: the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, plus the Sea of Marmara.
Related guides: The Treaty Record, Irrecord FAQ: Sources, Method and Perspective, The World Is Bigger Than Five, and the sister explainer from Soft Power Daily.
Irrecord presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.
- DiploBrief: The Istanbul Talks of 2022: What Did Türkiye's Mediation Between Russia and Ukraine Actually Deliver? — Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Istanbul talks 2022: a verified record of Antalya, the March talks, prisoner swaps and the grain deal, and what stalled.
- Region & Politics: Six Coastlines, One Strait: How the Black Sea's Littoral States Depend on Türkiye's Straits Regime — Six states border the Black Sea, but one straits regime controls access. How Montreux shapes riparian rights, NATO and Russian views and regional order.
- Treaty And Precedent: The Montreux Convention Line by Line: What Articles 19, 20 and 21 Actually Say About Warships and War — Montreux Convention articles 19 20 21 explained: belligerent warships, Türkiye's wartime discretion, the return-to-base exception and 2022 practice.
- Internatioon Review: How Does the Montreux Convention Work? Signatories, Article 19 and the Closure of the Straits in 2022 — How the 1936 Montreux Convention works: signatories, tonnage limits, Article 19 on belligerent warships and how Türkiye applied it in the Black Sea in 2022.
- Territorial Brief: Montreux Article 19 Explained: How Türkiye Closed the Straits to Belligerent Warships in 2022 — How Montreux Convention Article 19 closed the Turkish Straits to belligerent warships in 2022: rules, exceptions, tonnage limits and reactions.
- Narrative Filter: 'Neutral', 'Balancing' or 'Mediator'? Testing the Labels Applied to Türkiye in the Russia–Ukraine War — Is Türkiye neutral in the Russia Ukraine war? We test four labels—fence-sitter, enabler, NATO outlier, mediator—against Montreux, talks and grain data.
Frequently asked questions
Can Türkiye close the Turkish Straits at will?
No. Montreux gives Türkiye wide discretion over warships only if it is itself at war or considers itself threatened by imminent danger of war (Articles 20–21). When Türkiye is neutral, as in 2022, Article 19 sets rules that Ankara must apply to belligerents, and merchant vessels keep their right of passage.
What does Article 19 of the Montreux Convention say?
It says that when Türkiye is not a belligerent, belligerents' warships shall not pass the Straits, with limited exceptions. One clause lets belligerent warships separated from their bases return to them. Other warships pass under the peacetime rules in Articles 10–18.
Did Türkiye block Russian warships after the 2022 invasion?
Türkiye announced on 27–28 February 2022 that it was applying Article 19, which bars belligerents' warships including Russian ones, apart from documented returns to home bases. Turkish officials describe this as equal application to all belligerents. Details of individual passage requests were not fully published, so some points remain disputed.
Can NATO warships enter the Black Sea during the war?
Warships of non-belligerent states can transit under the peacetime rules, which impose limits on tonnage, aggregate presence and duration of stay (21 days) for non-Black Sea states, and require notification to Türkiye. This is why large or permanent NATO naval deployments in the Black Sea are constrained.
Is the Montreux Convention still in force?
Yes. Its original 20-year term ended in 1956, but it continues in force because no signatory has denounced it. Türkiye says it wants to preserve the Convention, and no major party has formally called for denunciation.
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